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Conclusion 
Monitoring and assessing the implementation of the treaties and evaluating their effectiveness 
is a complex process. The effectiveness of treaties and the monitoring bodies depends on a gen 
uine willingness of states parties themselves to respect and ensure the rights stipulated in the 
treaties, as well as the involvement of active NGOs, UN agencies, and individuals. 
Cynical observers may argue that states parties may simply ignore recommendations they 
dislike due to the absence of a strong enforcement mechanism, and even the most passionate sup 
porters of the treaty system are aware of its shortcomings. However, experience demonstrates 
that the work of the treaty bodies has become an important framework for change, with much 
depending on those involved in the process to work for real changes in practice on the ground. 
Moreover, the system is exploring measures to encourage and enable compliance and provide 
an effective mechanism for public pressure to hold violators accountable. Greater efforts are 
needed to ensure that the reporting system can reach its fullest potential, particularly in terms 
of adequate data collection and analysis and formulation of sound implementation strategies. 
Little will be settled without carefully designed empirical studies that assess the impact of the 
treaties and their monitoring procedures and give real guidance on the causal factors that facil 
itate or obstruct compliance. 
In the meantime, current reform initiatives must be supported and the value of the core 
treaties reaffirmed. Those treaties set the benchmarks against which the behavior of states 
parties must be measured. Efforts should be concentrated on ensuring that the rights enshrined 
in those treaties are afforded to all those who need them most, in every corner of the globe. 
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More than fifty years ago, the nations of the world came together to make a revolutionary 
pledge: Together, they would work to promote "universal respect for and observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms."1 
Although significant progress has been made toward this goal in the half-century since, the 
world remains rife with human rights abuses. In Haiti, the turmoil unleashed in the wake of 
Aristide's removal from power has opened the door to growing violence. In Nigeria, the weeks 
leading up to local elections saw politically motivated killings and the use of violence to secure 
votes. Ethnic violence continues to seethe in the former Yugoslavia, with recent news of attacks 
on Serbs by ethnic Albanians. 
The continuing?and in some parts of the world worsening?reality of human rights vio 
lations raises a difficult question for advocates and students of international law: Can inter 
national human rights law be used to help bring an end to such atrocities? 
To answer this question, we must first know something about the effect of current inter 
national laws on states' human rights practices. How do the existing human rights treaties shape 
state behavior? Are some more effective than others? If so, why? 
The Study of Human Rights Law 
Until recently, there were few systematic efforts to explore these issues. Advocates of inter 
national law tended to operate on the assumption that the laws were effective "most of the 
time." Skeptics derided the role that international law could play in shaping state behavior, 
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arguing that because it carried few explicit sanctions, international law could not be effective. 
Neither side spent much time considering what worked and what did not, much less why. 
In recent years, this has begun to change. A burgeoning new literature on compliance with 
international human rights law has contributed greatly to our understanding of the impact of 
human rights law on the human rights practices of states. 
Two types of research have predominated. The first?the staple of empirical research in the 
human rights field?has been qualitative case studies that examine particular treaties or coun 
tries in great depth and give detailed evidence of how one or several countries have reacted to 
international law. For example, Laurence Heifer offers a revealing study of what he terms the 
overlegalization of international human rights law in three Commonwealth Caribbean coun 
tries.2 Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink examine the impact of human rights prohibitions on 
torture, disappearances, and democratic governance in several Latin American countries.3 
These works and others of a similar character provide deep insights into how law can influence 
state action. 
The obvious drawback of this work, however, is that it is not well suited to the task of iso 
lating the role that law plays in changing state behavior. When a state begins to torture less 
frequently, for instance, it is difficult to determine with a historical case study whether the 
change is due to ratification of an international legal convention, the cessation of a civil war, 
improved economic conditions, some combination of these changes, or something else entirely. 
In response to this problem, a second set of empirical scholarship uses large-N quantitative 
methods to explore the effect of international law on human rights practices. This work assesses 
the human rights practices of large numbers of countries in an effort to analyze the impact of 
law on state practice.4 My own work, for example, has sought to examine the effect of several 
universal and regional human rights agreements on state use of torture, fair trial practices, civil 
liberties, genocide, and women's political representation.5 
This work, of course, has its own limitations. Most notably, the results of quantitative 
empirical work are only as good as the data on which they rest, and the data are sparse and 
sometimes?though, I would argue, far from universally?of questionable value. Hence, con 
clusions from this work must be drawn with caution.6 
Key Findings of Existing Studies 
Together, these two types of empirical work have greatly enriched our understanding of the 
relationship between international human rights law and the human rights practices of states. 
Quantitative studies have identified trends and relationships across large numbers of countries 
and significant periods of time. Qualitative case studies have examined trends on the ground, 
tested the plausibility of causal claims, and provided the context necessary for a deep under 
standing of causal relationships. 
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Several valuable insights have emerged from this growing body of empirical human rights 
research, three of which deserve special attention.7 
Domestic Enforcement of International Law Is Essential to Compliance 
Strong domestic institutions are essential to the international as well as the domestic rule of 
law. Where international bodies are less active in enforcement of treaty commitments?as in 
the area of human rights?it falls to domestic institutions to fill the gap. In some states, this reli 
ance on domestic institutions is effective, in others, less so. In democratic nations, where 
domestic enforcement tends to be relatively strong (in part because the judiciary, media, and 
political parties are free to operate independent of the executive), states are more likely to abide 
by international law whether or not it is externally enforced. In less democratic nations, where 
domestic enforcement tends to be less effective, states are less likely to abide by international 
law that is not enforced by transnational bodies. 
Indeed, the most robust finding in the empirical literature to date is that democratic nations 
behave differently with regard to international law than do nondemocratic nations. Andrew 
Moravcsik in examining the European Convention on Human Rights argues that international 
treaties offer states a means of consolidating democratic achievements, "thereby enhancing 
their credibility and stability vis-a-vis nondemocratic political threats."8 My examination of 
several multilateral and regional human rights treaties explores the role of democracy beyond 
the European context. In doing so, it reinforces Moravscik's claim that democracy matters, 
while challenging the specific spin he puts on the argument. 
I find that democracies are on the whole more likely to join international human rights 
treaties than nondemocracies, but they are less likely to join human rights treaties if they have 
worse human rights practices than if they have better practices. By contrast, nondemocracies 
are more likely to join if they have worse practices than if they have better practices. Moreover, 
only the most democratic states appear to improve their practices after ratifying human rights 
treaties.9 
There Appears to be a Tradeoff Between Participation in and the Effectiveness of Human 
Rights Treaties 
Although enforcement of international law by international actors is not essential to effective 
international law, it is far from irrelevant. Where international legal rules are accompanied by 
sanctions for their violation, there are several predictable results. Perhaps most obvious, where 
penalties for noncompliance with an international legal rule are significant, states not already 
in compliance are less likely to commit to a treaty. Hence, unless the sanctions are offset by 
incentives favoring commitment (such as strong reciprocal benefits to membership), treaties 
that contain such sanctions will gain fewer adherents. Thus, there is a tradeoff between en 
forcement and commitment: Where enforcement is stronger, all else being equal fewer coun 
tries should be expected to commit. However, those fewer adherents will be more likely to 
comply with the treaty than they would be if the treaty were less strongly enforced. 
The Convention Against Torture is a compelling example of this dynamic. My research found 
that countries with the worst torture ratings and countries with the best both ratify the Con 
vention at roughly the same rate. I find similar results for a wide array of human rights treaties. 
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While the states that join human rights treaties usually have better practices than those that do 
not, the difference between the two groups of nations is much smaller than many would expect. 
Moreover, states with poor human rights practices regularly join human rights treaties, some 
times at a rate similar to that of countries with the very best human rights practices. For 
example, roughly half the countries with the very worst genocide ratings have ratified the 
Genocide Convention?about the same portion of those with the very best ratings. 
In fact, holding political and economic factors constant, states with good human rights 
records are no more likely to commit to human rights treaties than those with poorer records. 
Among nondemocratic nations, the pattern is even more striking: Nondemocratic nations with 
worse reported human rights practices appear more likely to have ratified human rights treaties 
than those with better reported practices.10 
Nonlegal Incentives Have Power 
Nonlegal incentives play an important role in state decisions to participate in and comply 
with international law. Several implications arise from this finding, one of which I will discuss 
here: Membership in certain treaties can boost a state's reputation, often regardless of whether 
the member state actually abides by the treaty. This is possible because the international com 
munity does little to police many treaties, which means that member states that do not police 
themselves may have little risk of exposure if they fail to abide by treaty requirements. As a 
consequence, states that violate treaties and have weak domestic rule-of-law institutions have 
every reason to join treaties that confer reputational benefits, such as human rights treaties. It 
can be expected that states that join treaties primarily to obtain such benefits will not always 
comply with them, and sometimes have even worse practices subsequent to commitment. 
Several of the empirical studies of human rights treaties support these claims. States regularly 
join treaties with which they are not in compliance. Indeed, the states with the best human 
rights practices (and hence the best reputations) are often more reluctant to join human rights 
treaties than those with worse practices (and hence worse reputations). This suggests that states 
with better practices have little to gain and something to lose by joining the treaties, whereas 
the opposite is true of states with poor practices. This supposition finds support in the addi 
tional finding that states that join human rights treaties regularly fail to improve their practices 
after doing so, regardless of whether their practices are consistent with the treaties or not.11 
Lessons for Activists, Academics, and Policymakers 
Though empirical work in human rights is still in its infancy, studies to date have helped us 
to think about human rights law in new ways, and they have offered important clues about how 
law can shape state behavior. Their findings not only form a foundation for future empirical 
research; they also offer guidance to policymakers and activists interested in using international 
law to protect human rights. 
Here, I take the opportunity to outline four important goals that draw from the early forays 
into empirical human rights research. 
The Vital (and Improvable) Role of NGOs 
If there is one conclusion that stands out in the research to date, it is that better information 
about countries' human rights practices is an important first step toward improving those 
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practices. To date, the bulk of the information on human rights practices has been produced by 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Yet as essential as this information has proven, it has 
not always been gathered as carefully and systematically as is necessary to make it reliable for 
tracing causal connections between international law on human rights and the human rights 
practices of various countries.12 A redoubling of these information-gathering efforts and atten 
tion to the critiques of existing studies could provide a more solid foundation for efforts to 
evaluate the successes and failings of existing laws. 
Better Connection of Theory and Practice 
The empirical research in human rights has provided a useful starting point for understanding 
the relationship between international human rights law and countries' human rights practices, 
but much more research and theorizing remains to be done, and it must be linked to concrete 
policy recommendations. Academics should continue to contribute to the debate over the 
effectiveness of human rights treaties by conducting further large-scale quantitative studies as 
well as additional qualitative case studies. 
We can also play an important role in assembling and analyzing the data generated by state 
actors and NGOs, formulating theories to help organize and explain the information that is 
generated daily, and helping to guide the information-gathering efforts of other actors. In doing 
so, we can strive to provide guidance to national and international policymakers on how best 
to use this information to create a more effective international human rights regime. 
Improving the Domestic Rule of Law 
A central conclusion of existing empirical studies of human rights practices is that domestic 
enforcement of international human rights commitments is crucial to their success. Improving 
enforcement of and compliance with international human rights agreements is not something 
that happens only at the international level. As important, if not more important, is enforcement 
at the domestic level. 
Domestic enforcement of international law in turn requires robust domestic rule-of-law insti 
tutions and individuals willing to use them to press governments to honor their international 
legal commitments. National policymakers and practitioners can play a central role in this 
process. In nations with weak or nascent rule of law institutions, national policymakers can 
ensure better international legal compliance by working to strengthen local rule of law. Where 
rule of law institutions are strong, policymakers and practitioners can ensure better compliance 
with international human rights law by working to maintain those institutions and using them 
where necessary to press governments to live up to their international commitments. 
Understanding Treaty Tradeoffs 
If, as the research indicates, there is a tradeoff between participation in and effectiveness of 
human rights treaties, international policymakers must look for ways to mediate this tradeoff. 
Treaties might be structured to offer states assistance to offset some of the costs of compliance. 
In addition, the fact that there are nonlegal incentives for treaty commitment and compliance 
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suggests that international policymakers could also use these incentives to encourage compli 
ance with international law?by, for instance, placing greater emphasis on monitoring states' 
compliance with their international human rights treaty commitments. Doing so would make 
it more costly for states to commit to treaties and then fail to comply with them, and it would 
more effectively reward states that join treaties and do comply with them, thus lessening the 
participation-effectiveness tradeoff. 
The Road Ahead 
We have learned a great deal in recent years about how states respond to international human 
rights law. In the process, we have come to appreciate anew both the power and the weaknesses 
of the international legal system. International law sets a standard against which state actions 
are judged?by those both inside and outside the state. It mobilizes the attention of the world 
to abuse of the world's most vulnerable. 
Yet violations of international legal protections remain rife, and current treaties often do little 
to change what states do. By working to better understand empirically when and why states 
abide by their international human rights commitments, we can make it possible for inter 
national law to more fully realize its great promise. 
